

THE IDEA OF GRAND STRATEGY

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The debate on British strategy-making continues with Peter Layton's reflections on the meaning and usefulness of the concept of 'grand strategy' in today's world. Grand strategy, he argues, is very distinct from 'strategy' and frequent tendencies to conflate the two overlook the former's wider scope and integrative, forward-looking nature: grand strategy aims to shape the world of the future.

In this age of austerity, grand strategy has returned to the public debate. With more demands than ever on scarce resources, clearly relating 'ends' to 'means' has become an imperative, suggesting grand strategy as a policy-making approach may once again be useful. In the modern globalised world, many states now worry about not just the most effective but also the most efficient way to achieve their desired objectives. Even in the US, there are concerns over how best to use declining relative resources to get the most impact, with a consequent resurgence of interest in exploring new grand strategic approaches.¹ Nowhere is this contemporary tension between great ends and contracting means more evident than in Britain, although eminent military historian Hew Strachan sees a possible solution when he writes that:²

[S]uccessive editions of the British National Security Strategy have continued to assert London's global ambitions, despite its diminishing resources ... the need for grand strategy, and for a coherent grand strategy at that, is all the greater because waste is both unaffordable and unforgivable.

Concerns over grand strategy have been further expressed in the *RUSI Journal*, at a recent RUSI conference on British strategy-making and in two House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee examinations of the matter.³ If grand strategy is now seen

as a conceptual approach that may help in better allocating scarce resources to difficult problems, there are often different understandings of what the term encompasses. Different authors have focused on disparate aspects and defined the term in often dissimilar ways. This uncertainty about the meaning of grand strategy extends to the House of Commons where the Public Administration Select Committee tried to investigate grand strategy, but decided the term sounded too imperial and 'hubristic' in the modern era and opted instead for national strategy, although the precise meaning of this term was left unstated.⁴

This article contends that grand strategy is a very distinct and specific type of strategy – yet this is not just simple pedantry. It is difficult to think about, devise or evaluate grand strategies if the term is not properly understood; it is also very difficult to compare proposals for new grand strategies unless all involved use terms with similar meanings. Recent writings have successfully returned the notion of grand strategy to public attention; the important issue now is to describe the term more accurately to allow a better focused debate to take the matter further.⁵ Indeed, an understanding of what makes strategy 'grand' may in itself address some concerns that presently confuse the wider national discussion. It is appropriate for the *RUSI Journal* to bring more precision to this term as grand strategy is of English origin; if the Germans and the Russians can lay claim to the operational level of war,

then surely Britain can lay claim to the important idea of grand strategy.

A Brief History of the Term

Grand strategy in the modern sense is an invention of the twentieth century.⁶ With the growing complexities of waging war, the word 'strategy' appeared in need of more granularity to allow more precise thinking. In his 1906 'Strategical Terms and Definitions Used in Lectures on Naval History', the naval historian Sir Julian Corbett divided strategy into major or grand strategy and minor strategy. Major strategy dealt with the 'whole resources of the nation for war', including military, economic, diplomatic and political matters, whereas minor strategy focused on operational plans.⁷ In his revised 1911 'Notes on Strategy', the expression 'grand strategy' was deleted, presumably to avoid the confusion between terms evident in his first use.⁸ His explanation of the scope of 'grand' strategy, however, stuck and was later resurrected.

In his 1923 book *The Reformation of War*, Colonel (later Major General) J F C Fuller built on the 'total' war experience of the First World War and again introduced different types of strategy: grand, major and minor. Fuller's grand strategy directed a nation's 'military aspects, the moral [*sic*] of the civil population, the commercial and industrial resources ... [and] the element of spirit'.⁹ For Fuller, grand strategy was to be undertaken at the highest level of government and involved co-ordinating the material and social forces of the British Empire to be well prepared for any future conflict, as he considered it had



Soldiers from C Company The Royal Dragoon Guards patrol the Shin Kalay area of Nad-e-Ali, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, September 2010. Courtesy of SAC Neil Chapman/Crown Copyright.

not been at the start of the Great War. He devoted a chapter to exploring grand strategic policy-making in the Westminster parliamentary system; an appraisal almost a century before the 2010 Public Administration Select Committee again posed the question about who should conduct British grand strategy.

Fuller's innovative concept was made more lucid in 1929 in Basil Liddell Hart's *Decisive Wars of History* that included the seminal description of grand strategy:¹⁰

[T]he role of 'grand strategy' is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation towards the attainment of the political object of the war: the goal defined by national policy. Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man power of the nation in order to sustain the fighting services. So also with the moral resources, for to foster and fortify the will to win and to endure is as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. And it should regulate the distribution of power between the several Services and between the Services and industry. Nor

is this all, for fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy. It should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and, not least, ethical pressure to weaken the opponent's will. A good cause is a sword as well as a buckler. Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.

The strategic thinking of the dominant power of the early twenty-first century reflects this Liddell Hart legacy. Each US administration has been required since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act to publish regularly the country's National Security Strategy. The term has become synonymous in the United States with grand strategy, albeit this is a grand strategy for the specific purpose of 'developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security'.¹¹

These definitions of grand strategy are intended to guide analysis and thinking by providing a useful cognitive

framework, yet the idea of grand strategy has been rarely examined. The situation today remains much as Liddell Hart noted in 1929: 'the realm of grand strategy is for the most part *terra incognita* – still awaiting exploration, and understanding'.¹² In a recent book on strategy, Colin S Gray echoed Liddell Hart's complaint: 'Sophisticated and useful discussion of the concept ... of grand strategy has rarely been a growth industry amongst strategic theorists and historians....The theory of grand strategy still leaves much to be desired'.¹³ While definitions may have been devised, the concept needs further exploration to be more fully understood.

What Makes Strategy Grand?

Grand strategy is often confused and conflated with strategy; the two, however, are distinctly different, although they do share some aspects. 'Grand strategy' is principally distinguished by its more expansive scope; 'strategy', as commonly used, has a narrower span.

Strategy is derived from the Greek word *strategos*, 'army leader', yet today the term has lost its sole association with war and become much more

widely used across society. While there is no commonly agreed single definition, National War College scholar Terry Deibel has usefully developed a characterisation of 'strategy' that deliberately encapsulates the essence of many other contemporary definitions: 'strategy is a plan for applying resources to achieve objectives'.¹⁴ This is broadly in conformity with others such as Hew Strachan who sees strategy as a means to achieve the ends set by policy and Colin S Gray who writes that strategy is the 'direction and use made of means ... to achieve desired ends'.¹⁵ The key issue is that modern definitions of strategy generally focus on the application of resources, that is to say 'the means'.

Grand strategy by comparison is more than the application of resources; it also involves the development of these resources and their allocation. Grand strategy is concerned with assembling the manpower, money and material necessary to build and sustain the means needed. Depending on the grand strategy, these resources can be accessed domestically or internationally, from private or government sources, or in some complex combination. Importantly, a grand strategy must also build the legitimacy and soft power necessary to be implemented successfully. Grand strategy therefore provides the means used by strategy. This is a crucial difference that makes grand strategy distinctly different to not only strategy, but also to foreign policy and statecraft.

However, grand strategy is also concerned with the application of resources, but in ways that further delineate it from just 'strategy'. First, in grand strategy the means used are comprehensive, embracing a diverse array of instruments of national power rather than focusing on a single type of instrument, as strategy does. This national power is much wider than whole-of-government (also called inter-agency); it is whole-of-nation with external commercial and governmental sources also generally used in support. Fuller and Liddell Hart noted several different instruments of national power, while political scientist Harold Lasswell offers a simpler listing, much used in modern staff colleges: '[a]

fourfold division of policy instruments is particularly convenient when the external relations of a group are being considered: information, diplomacy, economics and military (words, deals, goods and weapons)'.¹⁶

Secondly, grand strategy is concerned with integrating the application of these diverse means with their creation and allocation into a coherent, cohesive whole. The essence of grand strategy is its integrative nature. In a conceptual sense grand strategy is a system: a set of interdependent elements where change in some elements or their relations produces change across the system, and the entire system exhibits properties and behaviours different from the constituent parts. In systems, 'outcomes cannot be understood by adding together the units or their relations, and many of the results of actions are unintended'.¹⁷ Inherently then, as a system, a grand strategy can only be understood in its totality, not as a set of disaggregated elements or units.

In an important work, economic historian Alan Milward shows that not only did the grand strategies of the Second World War's major combatants impact upon their domestic societies, but that the grand strategies adopted were also influenced and shaped by their respective domestic foundations.¹⁸ He develops a useful concept termed 'strategic synthesis' that involves the state purposefully striking a balance between the demands of its chosen grand strategy and the ability of the domestic base to meet these demands. In this, the external dimension of grand strategy, that applies the means, and the domestic dimension of power creation are not simply opposite sides of the same coin, but mutually determining elements.

Aaron Friedberg applies Milward's strategic synthesis to American grand strategy during the Cold War and determines that while the US progressively developed a suitable grand strategic synthesis, the Soviet Union did not. The Soviet Union, with its strong statist political culture, chose a grand strategy that made it into a 'garrison state', where primacy was given to military preparation at significant

detriment to society and the ultimate collapse of the state.¹⁹ Conversely, the US, with its anti-statist ideology, was more prudent and struck a better balance between military preparedness, long-term economic growth and societal prosperity. The US became a 'contract state', limiting extraction and mobilisation to very specific areas of the economy and becoming reliant upon private enterprise for the necessary research, development and manufacture of armaments.²⁰ The American grand strategy, as it progressively evolved, imposed less of a burden on its society and this gave the US greater resilience and robustness than the increasingly brittle Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's strategic synthesis was fatally flawed, while the US better balanced grand strategy demands and power creation and eventually prevailed.

The view of grand strategy as a complex system is a position implicitly and explicitly held by many historians, whose examinations of grand strategy typically range across many diverse interrelated areas integrated into a cohesive whole in an explanation as to why specific historical outcomes occurred.²¹ Historical examinations of the practice of grand strategy seem to support the definitional understanding; the concept of grand strategy as a distinct entity distinguished by expansive scope and integrative nature appears empirically valid.

Several further aspects emerge from the scope of grand strategy as integrating the development of resources, their allocation and the application of means. In considering the matter of who should make grand strategy, it is readily apparent that only at a specific and high level of government is there an understanding of these three separate areas and an ability to guide them. Edward Luttwak provides a useful insight when he talks of a grand strategy 'level', as it is only at a particular governmental level that the appropriate knowledge and capacity to determine and direct grand strategy is located.²² The implications of this for Luttwak are that 'All states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not. That is inevitable because grand strategy is simply the *level* at which knowledge and persuasion interact'.²³

Grand strategy, though, is simply a tool of state policy. Gray succinctly defines policy as ‘the purpose of governments’ and argues that grand strategy is strictly instrumental, being directed by policy rather than being part of, or indistinguishable, from it.²⁴ While policy drives grand strategy, thereby allowing grand strategy to guide its subordinate levels, there is more complexity in this than immediately apparent.

Grand strategy seeks to impose a preferred order on the future

Grand strategy academic Greg Foster observes that while policy is normally seen as informing grand strategy, in fact it is grand strategy that provides the overarching design into which specific pieces of lower-level policy fit; he writes that grand strategy is ‘the overall mosaic into which the pieces of specific policy fit. It provides the key ingredients of clarity, coherence, consistency over time’.²⁵ As a grand strategic concept cascades downwards through a governmental hierarchy, objectives and goals become progressively more narrowly and more precisely defined as a way of directing and controlling the subordinate levels.

Some strategic thinkers limit grand strategy to being only within the purview of states; some go further and assume that only certain kinds of states – great powers – can make grand strategy. Grand strategy, however, is a type of strategy rather than a specific function of a particular kind of political arrangement. The integration of power creation with the instruments of power and the careful balancing of resources with goals is important to all, perhaps even more so for small and medium states with limited resources.

This raises the further question of what grand strategy is for in a conceptual sense. Liddell Hart thought grand strategy to be future-focused in looking ‘beyond the war to the subsequent peace.’ However, grand strategy is much more ambitious than just being future-looking: it seeks to

impose a preferred state of order on the future. Steven Metz observes that grand strategy ‘entails order extended in time, space, and milieus.... [It] attempts to impose coherence and predictability on an inherently disorderly environment composed of thinking, reacting, competing, and conflicting entities’.²⁶

Grand strategy tries to shape the future in a certain sequence into a preferred construct that displays the desired orderliness and stability. Some conceive of grand strategy as ‘a conceptual road map’, but it is more than simply traversing a known space.²⁷ Instead, grand strategy is about taking a planned series of successive actions to create a preferred world at some future time. Opportunism and risk management are valid alternatives, but grand strategy deliberately and with forethought tries to construct the future.

Given the various elements involved in grand strategy however, the concept does not appear to be appropriate for short-term crisis periods, as the development of means in particular takes time. Moreover, in a crisis the aim is generally to return to the *status quo ante*, or to at least stabilise the situation to allow time for a more measured approach, rather than to create a new future. A crisis may also only involve one or two instruments, suggesting that a solely diplomatic, informational, military or economic strategy may be sufficient, rather than a grand strategic integration of them all.

If grand strategy seeks to impose a desired future order, there is considerable debate about whether this is only applicable to making war. Some contemporary strategic analysts remain strongly attracted to the idea of grand strategy staying closely related with military threats and war. This emphasis, though, is inconsistent with a concept of grand strategy as addressing high-level policy objectives and thus being goal-centred. Confusing threats and means with ends unhelpfully constrains the use of the concept of grand strategy; policy ends – not armed threats or military means – should determine grand strategy. War is an instrument of policy and as a means may be used by a grand strategy to achieve an objective set by

policy, but war is not the totality of grand strategy. Grand strategy historian John Lewis Gaddis writes:²⁸

[G]rand strategy is ... about how one uses whatever one has to get to wherever it is one wants to go. Our knowledge of it derives chiefly from the realm of war and statecraft, because the fighting of wars and the management of states have demanded the calculation of relationships between means and ends for a longer stretch of time than any other documented area of collective human activity. But grand strategy need not apply only to war and statecraft: it’s potentially applicable to any endeavour in which means must be deployed in the pursuit of important ends.

Non-Grand Strategies

A grand strategy is appropriate for those times when policy-makers know where they wish to take the ‘ship of state’. Grand strategy is demanding in its requirements in forcing decision-makers to identify clearly the ends they seek. At times, however, grand strategy may be an inappropriate policy tool and for these circumstances there are valid alternatives such as opportunism or risk management.

Under an opportunistic approach, a state’s policies change, shift and evolve as the situation requires, rather than being driven by a grand strategy that may not evolve as fast as the international environment changes. Japan, for example, is a country seemingly able to succeed through opportunism. Since the Meiji Restoration, Japanese leaders have been reactive to the forces shaping the modern international system, referring to these as *sekai no taisei* (trends of the world), *jisei* (trends of the time) or *hitsuzen no ikioi* (inevitable force of circumstance).²⁹ Likewise, in analysing US grand strategy in the Gulf since 1975, Steve Yetiv determined that there actually was no grand strategy, simply a continuing reaction to unexpected events and surprises.³⁰ Away from the great powers, journalist Paul Kelly saw the Australian government of John Howard (1996–2007) similarly eschewing grand strategies and instead adopting an approach of quickly responding to

rapidly changing events; it was a 'study in political opportunism'.³¹

The difficulty with opportunism is that it is a policy that is reactive to events and the actions of others. In being responsive, the state using opportunism does not initiate and therefore must accept boundaries determined elsewhere; the state is part of another's project and is responsive to that. This more activist state sets the grand strategic agenda and determines the framework of the debates, cognisant of its own goals and capabilities. The opportunist state can only be ready to react as circumstances dictate.

An alternative non-grand strategy is to adopt a risk-management approach that guides actions to mitigate the impact of calamities deemed unavoidable. All countries will at some time suffer misfortunes, but taking specific actions before these occur can reduce their impact. The high-level objectives of such anticipatory action can vary from building capabilities and capacities to survive shocks, to continuing operation in the presence of external stresses, to recovering from shocks to the original form, or to absorbing shocks and evolving in response. States may always

be sensitive to certain stressors, but risk management aims to reduce their vulnerability to the external shocks that do occur.

The alternatives of opportunism and risk management are means-centred, not ends-centred as grand strategy is. A grand strategy has a defined policy goal that animates it, whereas opportunism and risk management await developments. The opportunist and risk-management approaches still require resources to be developed and allocated, and the instruments of national power built, but the purpose for which this is done is undefined until an opportunity presents itself or a risk eventuates.³² The means await the ends, the reverse of grand strategy.

Grand Strategy in the Public Debate

Grand strategy is not strategy: the two are often confused and conflated, but they are conceptually different. Grand strategy has an expansive and integrative scope encompassing the development of the economic, demographic and social resources of a society, the allocation of these resources, and the application

of the various instruments of national power in a unified fashion. As there are tactical, operational and strategic levels, so there is a grand strategy 'level'.

Although at times the presence of a grand strategy may be obscured, grand strategy both creates the conditions for strategy and guides it. Alternatives such as opportunism and risk management respond to events and emerging circumstances. Grand strategy is instead a unique policy instrument that tries deliberately and with forethought to construct the future. Its return to the public debate is overdue. ■

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Notes

- 1 Examples include Robert J Art, 'Selective Engagement in the Era of Austerity', in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M Lord (eds.), *America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration* (Washington DC: Center for a New American Security, May 2012), pp. 13–28; Andrew F Krepinevich et al., *Strategy in Austerity* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2012); Clark Murdock and Kevin Kallmyer, 'Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of Limits and Constraint', *Orbis* (Vol. 55, No. 4, Fall 2011), pp. 541–57; Patrick M Cronin, *Restraint: Recalibrating American Strategy* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2010); William C Martel, 'Grand Strategy of "Restraint"', *Orbis* (Vol. 54, No. 3, Summer 2010), pp. 356–73.
- 2 Hew Strachan, 'Strategy and Contingency', *International Affairs* (Vol. 87, No. 6, November 2011), pp. 1281–96, p. 1285.
- 3 Gwyn Prins, 'The British Way of Strategy-Making: Vital Lessons For Our Times', RUSI occasional paper, October 2011; 'Finding a Better British Way to Make Strategy', RUSI Conference, London, Thursday 27 October 2011; Lukas Milevski, 'A Collective Failure of Grand Strategy: The West's Unintended Wars Of Choice', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 156, No. 1, February/March 2011), pp. 30–33; Patrick Porter, 'Why Britain Doesn't Do Grand Strategy', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 155, No. 4, August/September 2010), pp. 6–12; Paul Newton, Paul Colley and Andrew Sharpe, 'Reclaiming the Art of British Strategic Thinking', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 155, No. 1, February/March 2010), pp. 44–50; House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, *Strategic Thinking in Government: Without National Strategy, Can Viable Government Strategy Emerge? Twenty Fourth Report of Session 2010–12* (London: The Stationery Office, April 2012); House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, *Who Does UK National Strategy? First Report of Session 2010–11* (London: The Stationery Office, October 2010).
- 4 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, *Who Does UK National Strategy?*
- 5 See, for instance, Gwythian Prins, 'The Armed Forces: Our Country Needs Them', *Daily Telegraph*, 7 June 2012; *Defence Management Journal*, 'UK Lacks a "Grand Strategy", MPs Warn', 8 March 2012; Tarak Barkawi, 'How Multiculturalism Can Save UK Grand Strategy', *RUSI.org*, July 2011; Robert Dover and Mark Phythian, 'Lost over Libya: The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review – an Obituary', *Defence Studies* (Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2011), pp. 420–44; Matthew Savill, 'UK Security Strategy: Clarity or Compromise?', *Defence Studies* (Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2011), pp. 359–95; Malcolm

- Chalmers, 'Keeping Our Powder Dry?', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 156, No. 1, February/March 2011), pp. 20–28; House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, *Who Does UK National Strategy? Further Report: Sixth Report of Session 2010–11*, HC 713 (London: The Stationery Office, 25 January 2011); *Guardian*, 'Security Strategy: The Age of Uncertainty', 19 October 2010; Philip Johnston, 'All at Sea on a Tide of Short-Term Thinking', *Daily Telegraph*, 19 October 2010; House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, *Who Does UK National Strategy? Written Evidence* (London: The Stationery Office, 2010); David Blagden, 'Strategic Thinking for the Age of Austerity', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 154, No. 6, December 2009), pp. 60–66; Colin S Gray, 'Britain's National Security: Compulsion and Discretion', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 153, No. 6, December 2008), pp. 12–18.
- 6 The expression was used in the nineteenth century, but principally in the sense of military strategy in the Jominian tradition with its emphasis on lines of operation and the capturing of territory. Examples include James H Ward, *A Manual of Naval Tactics: Together with a Brief Critical Analysis of the Principal Modern Naval Battles* (New York: D Appleton & Company, 1859), p. 153; George Ward Nichols, *The Story of the Great March: From the Diary of a Staff Officer* (New York: Harper & Brothers 1865), p. 17; W T Sherman, 'The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion', *The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine* (Vol. 36, 1888), pp. 597–98; George W Nichols, 'How Fort McAllister Was Taken', *Harper's Magazine* (Vol. 37, June–November 1868), pp. 368–70.
- 7 Julian S Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1911 (reprinted 1988)), p. 308.
- 8 *Ibid.*, pp. 326–27.
- 9 J F C Fuller, *The Reformation of War*, 2nd ed. (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1923), p. 214.
- 10 Basil H Liddell Hart, *The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy* (London: G Bell & Sons, 1929), p. 150.
- 11 John J Kohout et al., 'Alternative Grand Strategy Options for the United States', *Comparative Strategy* (Vol. 14, No. 4, 1995), pp. 361–420, p. 362. The definition of national security strategy comes from Department of Defense, 'Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms', 12 April 2001 (as amended through April 2010), p. 321.
- 12 Liddell Hart, *The Decisive Wars of History*, p. 151.
- 13 Colin S Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 48, note 20.
- 14 Terry L Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 5.
- 15 Hew Strachan, 'The Lost Meaning of Strategy', *Survival* (Vol. 47, No. 3, Autumn 2005), pp. 33–54, p. 33; Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, p. 18.
- 16 Harold D Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), pp. 204–05.
- 17 Robert Jervis, *Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 6.
- 18 Alan S Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
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- 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 341–51.
- 21 Examples include Paul Kennedy (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A Stein (eds.), *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
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- 23 Edward N Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 409.
- 24 Colin S Gray, *War, Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century* (New York: A Touchstone Book: Simon and Schuster 1990), p. 29.
- 25 Gregory D Foster, 'Missing and Wanted', *Strategic Review* (Vol. 13, Fall 1985), pp. 13–15, p. 14.
- 26 Steven Metz, *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2008), p. xviii.
- 27 Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 11.
- 28 John Lewis Gaddis, 'What Is Grand Strategy?', keynote address to the conference 'American Grand Strategy after War', Duke University, United States, 26–28 February 2009, p. 7.
- 29 Kenneth B Pyle, 'Japan: Opportunism in the Pursuit of Power', in Robert A Pastor (ed.), *A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World* (Basic Books, Perseus Book Group 1999), pp. 239–90, p. 243.
- 30 Steve A Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 192–97.
- 31 Paul Kelly, *Howard's Decade: An Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal* (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006), p. 47.
- 32 The distinct differences between grand strategy, opportunism and risk management are examined in more depth in Peter Layton, 'An Australian National Security Strategy: Competing Conceptual Approaches', *Security Challenges* (forthcoming, 2012).